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The End(s) of Legal Education
Frank H. Wu
Legal education is in jeopardy. 
There is no longer suffi  cient demand for the juris doctor degree from 
prospective students; the supply of seats exceeds the number of applicants 
possessing the credentials that have until recently been preferred by each 
respective institution.1 As a consequence, schools have had to implement 
“tuition discounting” at unprecedented levels even to enroll fewer individuals 
who are less qualifi ed by conventional predictors.2 Meanwhile, the mainstream 
press, with encouragement from the organized bar, has excoriated the legal 
academy for its failures, whether real or perceived.3 These critics have wondered 
about the “return on investment.”4 
I off er ruminations on the “business model” of legal education. These 
musings were presented in my speech to the participants in this symposium 
on “The Future of Legal Scholarship” at Northeastern University in spring 
2016. I use the term “business model” deliberately and advisedly, out of the 
1. The Law School Admissions Council releases extensive applicant volume data. See 
Three-Year Volume, LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, http://lsac.org/lsacresources/data/three-
year-volume  (last visited July 11, 2016).
2. See, e.g., The Law Schools that Off er the Biggest Tuition Discounts, BLOOMBERG http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-08/the-law-schools-that-off er-the-biggest-tuition-
discounts (Sept. 8, 2015); Karen Sloan, It’s a Buyer Market at Law School: Suddenly in Demand, 
Prospective Students Wonder, “How Much Money Can I Get?,” NAT’L L.J. (June 25, 2012), http://
www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202560485444/Its-a-buyers-market-at-law-school-
?slreturn=20160624180321. The “discount rate” has continued to increase throughout higher 
education. See Rick Seltzer, Discounting Hits New Highs, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/05/16/discount-rates-rise-yet-again-private-
colleges-and-universities. See also Maggie McGrath, The Invisible Force Behind College Admissions, 
FORBES (July 30, 2014),Vhttp://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/07/30/
the-invisible-force-behind-college-admissions/#7f2fd136efbc.
3. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Law School Bust, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2016, BU1. See generally BRIAN 
Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
4. Id. For a rebuttal presenting an empirical analysis of the economic value of the J.D. degree, 
see Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 
249 (2014).
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belief it is impossible to ignore fi scal realities, but with an abiding appreciation 
of academic traditions.
In my talk, I made three basic points. These are descriptive claims that 
should prompt normative conversations.
First, institutions of higher education are selling something. Teachers 
might prefer that students not characterize themselves as consumers for the 
sake of their own development as critical thinkers. Higher education is neither 
a product nor a service. Education demands engagement.
Yet the assertion cannot well be disputed—higher education carries a price 
tag. With the unusual exceptions of full-scholarship schools (for example, 
undergraduate programs at Berea and Deep Springs), individuals who 
matriculate pay for that privilege.5 They typically resort to debt fi nancing.6
Second, like any other economic entity, a law school has revenues and 
expenditures. At the end of the day, the budget must be balanced. A law 
school cannot run a defi cit repeatedly. As with any venture, insolvency is not 
an ideal outcome. The American Bar Association, as an accrediting authority, 
considers the sustainability of a law school in its approval process.7
The revenue is generated primarily from students. For the bulk of schools 
that are “tuition-dependent” in the term of art, that sum is the enrollment 
multiplied by the published tuition that is to be charged, adjusted by the 
“discount rate.” Income may also come from an endowment, annual giving, 
a state subsidy, and perhaps auxiliary enterprises. Most law schools are 
“embedded” within a structure greater than themselves, and they also may 
receive a subvention from a central administration while benefi ting from 
economies of scale.
In contrast, fewer than one in ten schools are “stand-alone” institutions. 
Such schools show more clearly the workings of legal education, because by 
defi nition they are dedicated exclusively to the fi eld and lack the support of a 
surrounding campus. Credit reporting agencies, which are about as objective 
as could be found an appraiser of the ongoing viability of a business, rate 
5. See Ten Best Colleges with Free Tuition in 2016, THE BEST COLLEGES, http://www.thebestcolleges.
org/10-best-colleges-with-free-tuition/ (last visited July 11, 2016). Other tuition-free/full-
scholarship schools, facing fi scal challenges, have changed their policies, such as The 
Cooper Union. See Tuition & Student Fees, THE COOPER UNION, http://cooper.edu/about/
fi nance-and-administration/fi nancial-faq/tuition-student-fees (last visited July 24, 2016).
6. The Law School Transparency Project has sought to present these data. Debt-Financed Cost 
of Attendance, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/reform/
projects/Non-Discounted-Cost/ (last visited July 11, 2016).
7. See Standard 201, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF 
LAW SCHOOLS 99 (2015-2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
misc/legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_aba_standards_for_approval_of_law_
schools_fi nal.authcheckdam.pdf.
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the independent law schools that issue debt. Moody’s has systematically 
downgraded these schools as businesses.8 
Third, law school spending is primarily on payroll. Among the people 
employed at the school, faculty members receive greater compensation than 
staff  members, on average.9
At virtually every law school, especially those that are AALS members, the 
production of original scholarship is expected of professors—indeed, AALS 
makes such activity a criterion for membership in its learned society.10 Unlike 
the standard practice in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) 
disciplines, however, few law professors receive external funding, meaning from 
sources outside the school itself, such as the National Science Foundation, the 
National Institutes of Health, or charitable foundations, for their pursuits. (In 
many fi elds, stature and even job security depend on such money.) 
The logical conclusion from these premises is that students at most schools 
remit tuition in part to support faculty performing research. The only exceptions 
are extraordinary law schools that control their own sizable endowments and 
can use the annual income from the corpus to support faculty research and 
scholarship.
Since all but the most elite schools devote tuition revenues substantially to 
faculty salaries, the teaching and the research functions essentially are bundled 
8. The Moody’s report is proprietary and available only by subscription. An example of 
analysis of its conclusions is Dan Filler, Analyzing Moody’s New Report on Law Schools (May 8, 
2014), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2014/05/analyzing-moodys-new-report-on-law-
schools.html.
9. The Society of Law Teachers collects such data, since the ABA was precluded from doing 
so by an antitrust settlement (observed beyond its time limit). See 2014-2015 SALT Salary 
Survey, 2015 SALT EQUALIZER 1, https://www.saltlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/
SALT-salary-survey-2015-REVISED-fi nal.pdf. Cf. Professionals in Higher Education Salary Survey, 
COLL. & UNIV. PROF’L ASS’N FOR HUMAN RES., http://www.cupahr.org/surveys/phe.aspx 
(last visited July 24, 2016) (comparable survey of higher education professionals who are not 
faculty members). 
  A signifi cant issue, beyond the scope of this article, is that of administrative costs—
including those of executives. At most institutions, cuts over the past few years have aff ected 
staff  more than faculty. At UC Hastings, for example, even as I eliminated thirty-two of 
200 staff  positions in the fi rst-ever comprehensive layoff , we protected all faculty from the 
process and even continued to hire tenure-track professors. Many of the new requirements 
imposed on institutions have necessitated additional personnel. Sexual assault prevention 
and remediation, a laudable cause, has been mandated, and that means specialists with 
expertise must be hired. See Anemona Hartocollis, Colleges Spending Millions to Deal With Sexual 
Misconduct Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (March 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/
us/colleges-beef-up-bureaucracies-to-deal-with-sexual-misconduct.html?_r=0. As for 
compensation of the most senior leaders, I agree it has become excessive, but I also know 
better than to brag about one’s own virtues. I will note only that I returned well into the 
six fi gures from my own salary to a scholarship fund for students oriented toward public 
interest, refused raises, and otherwise held down perquisites.
10. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, in 2016 HANDBOOK § 
6-1(b)(2) (“The Association values and expects its member schools to value . . . scholarship, 
academic freedom, and diversity of viewpoints.”).
21The End(s) of Legal Education
together as a package; it is impossible at the better law schools to purchase 
the former without contributing to the latter. Students who wish to be trained 
to join a profession are required to underwrite professors’ own intellectual 
interests. There is no option to disaggregate teaching and research, at either 
the institutional level or the individual level.11
It could be argued that students receive an incidental benefi t, because 
professors who are especially productive improve the scholarly reputation of 
the school, and that reputation, in turn, boosts rankings.12 In an instrumental 
albeit indirect manner, students spend for reputation and rank, enhancing 
their own employment prospects.13
Therefore, we should perform a cost-benefi t analysis for the sake of our 
students. Discussions about legal scholarship tend to be caricatured or 
hyperbolic. They proceed from either the proposition that said scholarship 
is invaluable and cannot be reduced to crass measurements applied in other 
contexts, or from the proposition that virtually all of law faculties’ published 
output is manifestly useless and mere self-aggrandizement.
More accuracy and nuance are imperative. Assuming that legal scholarship 
has some intrinsic value,14 the issues are whether that benefi t is commensurate 
with the cost, and, as important, by whom it should be borne.
11. There is no law school analogue to the selective liberal arts college. Liberal arts colleges 
belong to a separate Carnegie classifi cation from research universities, and they are ranked 
in a separate list by U.S. News & World Report (which adopts the Carnegie system). The elite 
liberal arts colleges have faculty who perform research—and they would claim, and I would 
not dispute—of the same quality, albeit lesser quantity, than their counterparts at a research-
intensive institution. Williams can be number one, despite Harvard.
  Because law schools are ranked on a unitary scale, there is no such thing as a law school 
that is the equivalent of the selective liberal arts college. It likely could not develop without 
a separate Carnegie classifi cation and separate list in U.S. News.
  For more background on the Carnegie system, see Defi nitions, CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION 
OF INST. OF HIGHER EDUC., http://carnegieclassifi cations.iu.edu/defi nitions.php (last visited 
July 24, 2016).  
12. See Theodore Eisenberg, Assessing the SSRN-Based Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L. REV. 285 
(2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law 
Schools, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1998).
13. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF 
LEGAL CAREERS 42-44 (2004) (showing importance of law school selectivity on initial salaries 
following graduation).
14. Lest a reader come to an erroneous conclusion about my opinion, I note that I have 
written extensively in blogs about the value of rule of law and, specifi cally, the role of legal 
scholarship, using examples such as product safety in China as compared with the United 
States, the public policy issues presented by autonomous vehicles, and the contributions 
scholars can make on a decision such as secession of a state. See Frank H. Wu, How the 
Rule of Law Helps Us Buy Flax Seed Oil, LINKEDIN (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/20140214170447-13561052-how-the-rule-of-law-helps-us-buy-flax-seed-oil?trk=mp-
reader-card; Frank H. Wu, The Future of Scotland and the Role of Scholars, LINKEDIN (Sept. 12, 
2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140912205642-13561052-the-future-of-scotland-
and-the-role-of-scholars?trk=mp-reader-card; Frank H. Wu, How Autonomous Vehicles Will Come 
to the Road: Rule of Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.huffi  ngtonpost.com/
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I happen to be skeptical about the sustainability of the current “business 
model.” I doubt the capacity of institutions, other than those with the greatest 
resources, to compete indefi nitely with one another to simultaneously enroll 
suffi  cient numbers of students to make their budgets, as well as to defeat rivals 
in the rankings. Specifi cally, I am concerned about whether they can perform 
both of those tasks under the constraints of the supply of seats exceeding the 
demand and under the current regime of rankings methodology, distinct from 
the discussion of whether they ought to do so. My contention is that they 
cannot do both simultaneously, whether or not that is some sort of ideal.
One or the other is feasible. But choices must be made between, on the 
one hand, enrollment and hence revenue, and, on the other hand, selective 
metrics. Those choices give rise to (or should set in motion) discussions about 
competing objectives. 
Here is the most concrete example of how the decision plays out.15 In the 
summer, law schools turn to their wait lists for “enrollment management” 
purposes. They increasingly game the wait lists, as applicants do; they keep 
a signifi cant reserve of potential fi rst-year students on the wait lists, because 
outright acceptance will aff ect their admissions rate (and rankings), while 
outright rejection risks ending up with far too few incoming students. As they 
lose students who have paid deposits, because of better off ers (including the 
decision not to attend any law school at all), they can admit replacements. The 
wait list consists primarily of students with one or another credential (LSAT 
or UGPA) lower than what the law school would prefer (probably its median 
for that indicator).16 The trade-off  is presented. Admitting that next student 
means more tuition revenue and a slight slide toward the “tipping point” of 
the LSAT or UGPA falling a point or tenth of a point, respectively; rejecting 
the student means less tuition revenue and preserving the qualifi cation.
The complication is that the dilemma is faced by more than a single school. 
It is faced by almost all of them. 
frank-h-wu/how-autonomous-vehicles-w_b_8831644.html.
  The Scotland piece alludes to BRAD R. ROTH, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND MORAL 
DISAGREEMENT: PREMISES OF A PLURALIST INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2011); JOEL SAMUELS 
ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LAW: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE WORLD LEGAL Order (2013); 
Brad R. Roth, Secessions, Coups, and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the Eff ective 
Control Doctrine, 11 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 393 (2010); Brad R. Roth, The Virtues of Bright Lines: 
Self-Determination, Secession, and External Intervention, 16 GERMAN L.J. 384 (2015) (Special Issue on 
the Crisis in Ukraine); Joel Samuels, Condominium Arrangements in International Practice: Reviving 
an Abandoned Concept of International Boundary Dispute Resolution, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 727 (2008).
15. For a description of the decision by one school, see Elizabeth Olson, Minnesota Law School, 
Facing Waning Interest, Cuts Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/13/business/dealbook/minnesota-law-school-facing-waning-interest-cuts-
admissions.html.
16. See Natalie Kitroeff , The Smartest People Are Opting Out of Law School, BLOOMBERG (April 15, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-15/the-smartest-people-are-opting-out-
of-law-school; and Jordan Weissmann, Desperate Law Schools Are Admitting Way Too Many Poorly 
Qualifi ed Students, SLATE (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/10/29/
law_schools_are_admitting_too_many_poorly_qualifi ed_students.html.
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The dean of each might be tempted, as in other prisoners’ dilemma 
situations, to seek advantage for her school. A single actor could behave in a 
manner that is rational in isolation, but irrational in the aggregate.
The thinking is that if one could hold on just long enough, perhaps with 
predatory pricing, others will be driven out of the market or signifi cantly 
weakened. Deans can try to use selective tuition discounting to buy highly 
credentialed students away from schools ranked higher, or even some tuition 
discounting to buy lesser-credentialed students away from schools ranked 
lower (so long as the latter group doesn’t adversely aff ect rankings). Or they 
can gamble that the trends are temporary, not a permanent “new normal,” 
such that they can ask for a loan from the central administration or tap into 
reserves, to wait it out.
The alternative is to make decisions, very unpopular decisions. An overly 
simplifi ed but useful means to consider the choices tracks the revenue and 
expenditure sides of the ledger. A school could maintain its revenue by 
admitting students who likely will cause its rankings to fall. For many 
schools a bit of room remains—such students would not be, strictly speaking, 
“unqualifi ed,” only less qualifi ed than the school has been accustomed to. 
Or a school could allow its revenue to decrease, bringing expenditures in 
line. Since expenditures are human resources, that entails eliminating jobs, 
increasing effi  ciencies, or both (and the overall cost of instruction is increased 
by the amount that goes to noninstructional activities). Faculty, for instance, 
could take on greater teaching loads, presumably to the detriment of scholarly 
productivity.
Finally, were the law school applicant pool to burgeon once again to record 
levels, the problem would be less obvious and urgent. It would cease to be a 
problem for the law schools (and administrators and professors). But it would 
remain a problem for the law students who are charged the tuition and have 
reasonable expectations that the degree will be worth it.
Nothing in this situation is novel. It is the application of economic 
principles accepted in everything from the manufacturing of consumer goods 
to the rendering of professional services.17
Before the legal academy can address any of these problems, people—
specifi cally professors—must be persuaded that there is a problem, or set of 
problems. If the belief persists that all that is needed is for a single individual 
to emerge, with a diff erent strategy or the charisma to attract philanthropic 
largesse, then as a corollary the nature of the diffi  culty, collective and structural, 
will be denied.
That will lead to disaster.
17. With respect to the legal profession, see RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 
RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2010).
